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UNIVERSITY OF AKRON SCHOOL OF LAW 
SECOND ANNUAL IP FORUM, NOVEMBER 14, 2008 
“The fundamental things apply, as time goes by.”  Herman 
Hupfeld, “As Time Goes By”, Casablanca (1942)1 
I. INTRODUCTION:  BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 
As lawyers, judges and law professors reach retirement age, there is 
little that we remember of our first-year course in torts.  The cases we 
studied, our professors’ personalities—even the psychological trauma of 
the first pointed Socratic question directed at us—all are lost in the mists 
of time. 
Yet some things remain.  Among them are the name and facts of 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,2 one of the most memorable cases 
in all of American common law.  A great judge, Benjamin Cardozo, 
penned the majority opinion. 
The facts of Palsgraf stick in our minds because Judge Cardozo 
helpfully outlined them in his very first paragraph.  Two men rushed to 
 
 1. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). 
 2. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
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catch a moving train.  One made it easily.  The other, carrying a 
nondescript package covered in newspaper, teetered near the open door.  
A guard held the door open and reached out to steady him, causing the 
package to fall on the rails.  The package turned out to contain 
fireworks, which exploded.3  The resulting shock wave “threw down 
some scales at the other end of the platform, many feet away.”4  The 
falling scales injured the plaintiff, who sued the railroad for negligence.5  
These odd facts—a law professor’s bizarre hypothetical come to life—
survive the passage of time and stick in memory. 
Yet time and custom have distorted Judge Cardozo’s opinion.  We 
remember the case as one about proximate cause.  Indeed, casebooks (at 
least in my student days) used Palsgraf to introduce us to that element of 
torts.  Judge Cardozo, however, apparently thought the case was about 
duty and culpability, to which he devoted nearly all of his opinion.6 
Cardozo wrote that there could be no duty to plaintiff unless the 
risk of injury to her was reasonably foreseeable.7  In other words, the 
railroad owed the plaintiff no duty unless its employee could reasonably 
foresee the danger to her and so was culpable in failing to avoid it. 
Only in dictum, in his penultimate paragraph, did Judge Cardozo 
address (and dismiss) the issue of proximate cause, writing “[w]e do not 
go into the question now.”8  That issue, he opined, was really a matter of 
damages: the remedy, not liability.9  Yet, over the years his opinion has 
become a symbol of the very thing he did not decide.  Today we no 
 
 3. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. at 99-101. 
 7. If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and  
harmless, at least to outward seeming, with reference to [the plaintiff], did not take to 
itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong, though apparently not one 
involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with reference to some one else. 
Id. at 99.   
[T]he orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the 
orbit of the duty.  One who jostles one’s neighbor in a crowd does not invade the rights 
of others standing at the outer fringe when the unintended contact casts a bomb upon the 
ground.  The wrongdoer as to them is the man who carries the bomb, not the one who 
explodes it without suspicion of the danger.  Life will have to be made over, and human 
nature transformed, before prevision so extravagant can be accepted as the norm of 
conduct, the customary standard to which behavior must conform. 
Id. at 100.   
 8. Id. at 101. 
 9. See id.  Perhaps Judge Cardozo took this tack to blunt the argument of his colleague on 
the bench, who insisted that tort law already recognized damages as remote as a child’s loss of a 
parent’s income or a spouse’s loss of consortium.  See id. at 102-03 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
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longer consider proximate cause an element of remedy alone; it has 
become an element of the tort.  Right and remedy are now inextricably 
intertwined, as befits a legal system that tries to provide no right without 
a remedy. 
Although bizarre, the simple facts of Palsgraf are worlds away 
from the technological complexity of the Internet, on-line file sharing, 
and Web-spread pornography.  But the fundamental things apply.  In a 
world where corporations are still legal abstractions and liability 
necessarily falls ultimately on people,10 we are reluctant to impose tort 
liability without evidence of proximate cause and culpability. 
Infringement of intellectual property (IP) is just a kind of tort.  The 
“duty” to respect IP falls on the entire world, independent of contract 
and privity—a breadth of application characteristic of torts.  Yet, duties 
must have their limits.  They cannot extend so far outward that tendrils 
of unforeseen and unforeseeable liability infiltrate every part of our 
complex, interdependent economy. 
Judge Cardozo wrestled with how far along a railroad platform 
liability for dropping a package containing dangerous but hidden items 
should extend.  Just so, courts today must decide how far out on the web 
of Internet commerce infringement liability must extend.  Their 
decisions inevitably involve proximate cause. 
Insofar as culpability is concerned, IP infringement cases differ 
from other tort cases in one important respect.  Primary or direct 
liability for infringement has always been a strict-liability offense, 
independent of culpability and the infringer’s intent or state of mind.11  
 
 10. When a corporation pays a judgment, its loss has an immediate effect on shareholders and 
managers.  If the loss is large enough—or if a damage or injunctive remedy forces changes in 
products, services, or procedures—it may eventually affect employees, suppliers and customers.  If 
the loss is large enough to render the corporation uncompetitive and cause plant closings, it may 
ultimately affect even “innocent” citizens of the surrounding community.  A judgment that impairs 
the Internet’s operation may affect not only the value of the greatest tool for human communication 
yet invented.  It may also affect the free market in goods and services, much of which is electronic 
today, and even the functioning of democracy itself. 
 11. See infra note 18 (copyright); JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, § 2A.03 (ESP. 
INTRODUCTION) [hereinafter, Dratler & McJohn IP] (patents: describing how infringement depends 
only on “reading” the claims and assessing technological equivalents, not the alleged infringer’s 
intent).  The statement is less fully accurate for unlimited-term intellectual property—trademarks 
and trade secrets—than for the limited-term property mentioned in our Constitution, namely, patents 
and copyrights.  Culpability does enter the trademark-infringement calculus in assessing the alleged 
infringer’s good or bad faith, but only as one of eight of more factors in a multifactor analysis.  See 
Dratler & McJohn IP, supra at § 10.01[2], [3][g].  In trade-secret law, culpability affects judicial 
assessment of “improper means” in acquiring, using or disclosing the trade secret, i.e., 
misappropriation.  See Dratler & McJohn IP, supra at § 4.03[2] (introduction), [5][c].  It also 
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Yet, secondary liability—contributory infringement, inducement liability 
and vicarious liability—is not so limited.  As court after court has 
addressed novel issues of secondary liability, it has fallen back on the 
tried and true notion of culpability.12  The Supreme Court itself did so in 
creating a cause of action for intentional inducement of copyright 
infringement out of whole common-law cloth.13   
Even the struggle to reconcile culpability with the strictness of 
direct liability is not new.  Judge Cardozo wrestled with the very same 
question in Palsgraf.  For him, the difficulty was reconciling the notion 
of culpability with the fact that negligence was and is a non-intentional 
tort.14  His decision earned a place in law school casebooks by creating a 
modified version of culpability for cases of negligence:  failure to 
recognize and avoid foreseeable harm.15  By introducing the notion of 
foreseeability, Judge Cardozo recognized the non-deliberate nature of 
negligence but avoided the unfortunate consequence of unlimited 
liability for remote and unpredictable harm.  His decision has come to 
stand for a simple but very general principle: prudential judicial 
reluctance to let liability extend too far. 
This short paper attempts to show how courts can build—and are 
building—a rational jurisprudence of secondary liability for IP 
infringement upon the foundation of these two great common-law 
principles of tort law:  proximate cause and culpability.  Besides this 
introduction (Part I), the paper has four sections.  Part II discusses the 
notion of proximate cause and its application to cases assessing liability 
for IP infringement.  It also explores a modern, economic test for 
 
affects ultimate outcomes through the “smell test”—a non-black-letter judicial sensitivity to 
culpability that judges seldom acknowledge explicitly but that nevertheless permeates trade-secret 
law.  See Dratler & McJohn IP, supra at § 4.03[5][c].  Yet in no case does liability for direct and 
primary intellectual property infringement depend upon culpability to that extent that it does for 
intentional torts or negligence. 
 12. See generally JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL 
MILLENNIUM § 5A.03[1], [2] [hereinafter Dratler Cyberlaw].  See also infra Part IV. 
 13. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Common-Sense (Federal) Common Law Adrift in a Statutory Sea, or 
Why Grokster was a Unanimous Decision, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 413, 
418-29 (2006) [hereinafter Dratler, Statutory Sea]. 
 14. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100-01. 
 15. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101. 
If the harm was not willful, [the plaintiff] must show that the act as to him had 
possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the 
doing of it though the harm was unintended.  Affront to personality is still the keynote of 
the wrong. 
Id.  In light of his contribution to legal theory, we perhaps can excuse Judge Cardozo’s use of the 
masculine general—the customary grammatical form at the time—in discussing a case in which the 
plaintiff was a woman. 
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proximate cause:  the concept of least-cost avoider.  Part III discusses 
the principle of culpability in cases of secondary liability and how to 
reconcile it with the traditional strictness of primary liability.  Part IV 
concludes with some observations about how decisions based on the 
probable consequences of alternative legal rules (Dare I say, “policy”?), 
still lurking in this obscure, nerdy field of IP, might some day re-emerge 
to give the common law new life. 
II. PROXIMATE CAUSE AND LEAST-COST AVOIDERS 
One of the most important cases on proximate cause in cyberlaw 
was not about secondary liability at all.  In Religious Technology Center 
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc. (Netcom),16 the first 
issue was direct and primary liability for copyright infringement.  The 
plaintiff had sued two Internet service providers for copying and 
broadcasting over the Internet (publicly displaying) infringing material 
that a Usenet user had posted on a bulletin-board service.17 
From a doctrinal perspective, the case was simple, clear and sound.  
Electronic equipment that the defendants had set up, owned and operated 
had made and transmitted innumerable, exact copies of the infringing 
material over the Internet.  Black-letter copyright doctrine then treated 
(and still treats) direct copyright infringement as a strict-liability offense, 
independent of intent.18  So the fact that defendants did not even know of 
the infringement until notified or served with process did not matter.  
Based on black-letter copyright law, the copyright infringement claim 
presented an open and shut case. 
Yet the district court was uncomfortable.  It wriggled and squirmed, 
finding a “volitional” element in direct copyright infringement,19 despite 
strict liability, but failing to explain convincingly how “volition” differs 
from “intent” or “state of mind.”  It analogized the defendants to persons 
 
 16. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc’n. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
 17. See id. at 1365-66. 
 18. See generally Dratler Cyberlaw, supra note 12 at § 5A.02 (introduction).  The two 
leading cases are Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931) (hotel proprietor 
that “tuned in on” commercial broadcast for commercial purposes “necessarily assume[d] the risk 
that in so doing he may infringe the performing rights of another”), and De Acosta v. Brown, 146 
F.2d 408, 410, 411-12, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 311 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945) 
(upholding infringement liability of allegedly “innocent” publisher who relied on infringing author’s 
impressive research and contractual warranties of original work). 
 19. Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1370 (“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should 
still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely 
used to create a copy by a third party”). 
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setting up general-purpose copying machines, which others may have 
used to copy unknown and possibly infringing items;20 but it failed to 
consider that a special statutory amendment protected only libraries from 
such liability, and then only under special conditions.21  
Having exhausted legal sophistry and semantics, the court got down 
to the real reason why it rejected the plaintiff’s theory of direct liability.  
That theory, it wrote, 
would create many separate acts of infringement and, carried to its 
natural extreme, would lead to unreasonable liability. . . .  It would also 
result in liability for every single Usenet server in the worldwide link 
of computers transmitting [the infringing] message to every other 
computer.  These parties, who are liable under plaintiffs’ theory, do no 
more than operate or implement a system that is essential if Usenet 
messages are to be widely distributed.22  
In other words, the theory that every operator of every node on the 
Internet independently “caused” the infringement by allowing infringing 
copies to pass through its system would have extended liability too far 
and impaired the economic viability of the Internet.  Somewhere, Judge 
Cardozo was smiling. 
The Netcom Court also addressed secondary liability for copyright 
infringement.  In its view, the lens of secondary liability was a better one 
with which to examine the case.23 
Yet the law of secondary liability complicated the picture, for it 
involved two separate tests, each with two parts.  A defendant was liable 
for contributory infringement if he (1) knew or should have known of 
the infringement and (2) made a material contribution to it.24  He was 
liable for vicarious infringement if he (1) had the right and ability to 
control the infringement; and (2) derived a direct financial benefit from 
it.25  The Netcom Court found that the ISPs, which had charged users 
only general monthly fees, independent of what the users viewed or 
downloaded, derived no direct financial benefit from the infringement.  
Therefore it granted the defendants summary judgment on the vicarious 
 
 20. See id. at 1369. 
 21. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(f). 
 22. Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1369-70. 
 23. See id. at 1369 (“Although some of the people using the machine may directly infringe 
copyrights, courts analyze the machine owner’s liability under the rubric of contributory 
infringement, not direct infringement”). 
 24. See Dratler Cyberlaw, supra note 12, at §5A.03[2][b][i]. 
 25. See id. at § 5A.03[2][c].  
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liability claim.26  But for purposes of contributory infringement it found 
that the plaintiff’s notice had given the defendant knowledge of the 
infringement, and there were triable issues of material contribution, i.e., 
whether the defendant could have stopped the infringement by policing 
material going through its network and eliminating infringing items.27  
The threat of liability posed by trial on that issue caused the Internet 
industry to seek protection from Congress, which later adopted Section 
512 of the Copyright Act.28 
Both the issue that the Netcom Court set for trial (material 
contribution for contributory infringement) and the undecided element of 
vicarious liability (right and ability to control the infringement) could 
just as well have been framed in terms of proximate cause.  In both 
instances, the underlying factual issue was whether the primary 
defendant had the practical ability to police the millions of messages 
passing through its systems every day and remove infringing ones, 
without incurring excessive cost or shutting down access by innocent 
parties.29  If it had that ability and had failed to stop the infringement, its 
failure could have been viewed as the proximate cause of the third 
party’s infringement and therefore an independent tort.  In each case, the 
court refused to decide the factual point by summary judgment. 
The Tiffany case30 was similar, although it involved trademark law.  
There the famous jewelry company sued eBay, the on-line electronic 
auctioneer, for (inter alia) allowing too many third parties to sell 
counterfeit Tiffany jewelry through its service.31  As the court described 
it, eBay had mounted a huge (and hugely expensive) effort to preclude 
sales of infringing and illegal items through its service generally.32  
Tiffany had been one of the leading users and beneficiaries of that effort.  
Applying the Supreme Court’s legal standard for contributory 
infringement of trademarks,33 the court held that Tiffany “had failed to 
 
 26. See Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1376-77. 
 27. See id. at 1373-75. 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (entitled “Limitations on liability relating to material online”). 
 29. There was evidence that the only practical means of shutting down the infringing 
transmissions was to deny access to the Internet to a bulletin-board system with 500 paying users, 
499 of whom were presumed innocent.  See Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1366, 1376-77, & 1371 n.17. 
 30. Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 31. See id. at 469. 
 32. See id. at 476-479. 
 33. See id. at 502 (applying the non-inducement prong of the Inwood test for contributory 
infringement: “continu[ing] to supply [a] product to one whom [the defendant] knows or has reason 
to know is engaging in trademark infringement” (quoting Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives 
Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982))).  The Tiffany Court rejected a laxer (“reasonably 
anticipate”) standard of the Restatement, reasoning that the Supreme Court had rejected it in 
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prove that eBay continued to supply its service to sellers whom eBay 
knew to be selling actual counterfeits.”34 
But here again the court could have reached the same result more 
easily by applying the universal tort doctrine of proximate cause.  As the 
court described in elaborate detail,35 both parties had made considerable 
effort to curtail traffic in counterfeit Tiffany products by third-party 
sellers on eBay.  But Tiffany had had little more than the equivalent of 
one full-time employee36 doing policing and had generated 284,139 
notices of infringement.37  For its part, eBay had responded to virtually 
every notice by removing the auction listing for the infringing item, 
refunding sellers’ fees, and, in many cases, reimbursing buyers of 
counterfeit products.38  For over a year, the parties had cooperated 
amicably to curtail infringement of Tiffany’s trademarks through eBay’s 
auction services.39 
As the court itself noted,40 the crux of the dispute was eBay’s 
refusal to comply with Tiffany’s demand that eBay automatically 
remove any seller’s listing of five or more Tiffany items, or any amount 
of silver Tiffany items, even before receiving evidence that the items 
were counterfeit.  The court found insufficient evidence that eBay’s 
failure to follow these proposed rules permitted any more infringement 
than the considerable effort that eBay already took.41  It also found 
evidence that Tiffany’s proposed rules would be overinclusive, i.e., 
would prevent some eBay sellers from selling legitimate merchandise.42  
Based on these factual findings, the court could have held that eBay’s 
failure to follow these rules was no proximate cause of the third parties’ 
infringement. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10 v. VISA43 was another 
missed opportunity to clarify the law of proximate clause in the digital 
age.  There an on-line purveyor of copyrighted images of feminine 
 
Inwood.  See Tiffany Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 502-03 (rejecting the standard of Restatement (Third) 
of Unfair Competition § 27 (1995)). 
 34. Tiffany Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 491.  
 35. Id. at 486-93. 
 36. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Tiffany Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 489-90. 
 38. See id. at 478-79. 
 39. See id. at 481-83. 
 40. See id. at 482-83. 
 41. See id. at 481-83, 488-90. 
 42. See id. at 487-88. 
 43. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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pulchritude44 sued a credit card association for facilitating, through its 
credit-card transactions, on-line sales by foreign pirates of infringing 
copies of its images.45  Over a dissent by Judge Kozinski, the two-judge 
majority found no secondary liability, reasoning (in essence) that 
liability for bankers whose payment systems played no part in selecting 
or distributing the infringing images would extend too far.46 
The majority focused on the technological mechanics of the 
infringing enterprises.  Nowhere did the infringing images flow through, 
or even touch, the defendants’ computer systems, which were used only 
to verify cardholder status and facilitate payment.47  Unlike Google, 
which the same court had found potentially liable in a separate case 
brought by the same plaintiff,48 the defendants did not even help users 
select the infringing images.49  So by analogy and distinction (which are 
the proper approach in this federal-common-law field), the majority saw 
insufficient causal nexus to justify liability. 
But in this respect the majority failed to consider the bigger picture.  
As Judge Kozinski repeatedly emphasized in dissent,50 the decision was 
a judgment on the pleadings, so the plaintiff’s allegations had to be taken 
as fact.  The plaintiff had alleged that the infringers could not continue 
their piracy without the aid of online payment by credit card.51  It had 
claimed that stopping credit-card payment for infringing images would 
shut traffic in them down.52  Furthermore, many of the infringers were 
 
 44. There was apparently no assertion that the plaintiff’s images constituted “soft,” let alone 
“hard,” pornography.  It described its digital wares, without apparent objection, as “tasteful 
copyrighted images of the world’s most beautiful natural models.”  Id. 
 45. See id. at 792-93. 
 46. See id. at 796-800 (contributory infringement: no material contribution); id. at 802-06 
(vicarious liability: no right or ability to control the infringing activities). 
 47. See id. at 796-97 (material contribution); id. at 803-04 (right and ability to control 
infringement).  
 48. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google 
could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were 
available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 
10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps”). 
 49. See Visa, 494 F.3d at 797 (distinguishing Perfect 10 v. Amazon for purposes of material 
contribution); id. at 805 (same for right and ability to control infringement). 
 50. See id. at 810-11, 812 n.7, 816 n.12, 810-21 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  See also id. at 813 
(“At the pleadings stage, we must accept plaintiff’s allegations that credit cards are indispensable to 
the operation of the Stolen Content Websites, and that these websites would be forced out of 
business without them”). 
 51. See id. at 815 (discussing contributory infringement); id. at 819-20 (discussing vicarious 
liability).  See also id. at 813 n.8 (“The majority's prognostication as to what ‘might’ happen in the 
future leaves open the likelihood that it will not happen, and positively admits that there are no 
viable alternative payment mechanisms today”). 
 52. See id. at 819-20. 
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foreign and beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, and it seemed that 
stopping on-line payment was the only practical way to shut the foreign 
infringers down.53  Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, which 
had a general rule against serving “illegal” enterprises,54 and which in 
fact had used that rule against illegal offshore online gambling, profited 
mightily by declining to assert the same rule against the massive and 
deliberate copyright infringement for profit at issue here.55  The 
allegations suggested that the defendants’ failure to invoke that rule was 
not just a “but for” cause—but a key contributing cause—of the 
continuing infringement.56 
As Judge Kozinski pointed out,57 one or more of these allegations 
might have failed at trial, but the very purpose of a trial was to test them.  
In affirming dismissal of the claims on the pleadings, the majority took a 
narrow approach reminiscent of its similar technology-based analysis in 
Grokster.58  There the Ninth Circuit had focused primarily on the lack of 
a centralized index for infringing material that defendants could control; 
it had given short shrift to defendants’ methodical, deliberate and 
successful plan to take over Napster’s 50-million-plus deliberately 
infringing users after copyright litigation had put Napster out of 
business.59  The Supreme Court repudiated that failure to see the big 
picture, inventing a new, “inducement” theory of secondary liability in 
the process.60 
 
 53. See id. at 817-20 (“After all, how many consumers would be willing to send a check or 
money order to a far-off jurisdiction in the hope that days or weeks later they will be allowed to 
download some saucy pictures?”). 
 54. See id. at 717-18 & n.13.  See also id. at 824 (“Credit cards already have the tools to 
police the activities of their merchants, which is why we don’t see credit card sales of illegal drugs 
or child pornography”). 
 55. See id. at 820.  
Read fully and fairly, the complaint alleges that defendants are not merely passive 
providers of services available on equal terms to legal and illegal businesses alike; they 
are actually in cahoots with the pirates to prop up their illegal businesses and share their 
ill-gotten gains.  If this is not vicarious infringement, nothing is. 
Id. 
 56. See id. at 816 (“Defendants know about the infringements; they profit from them; they are 
intimately and causally involved in a vast number of infringing transactions that could not be 
consummated if they refused to process the payments; they have ready means to stop the 
infringements”). 
 57. See id. at 818 n.15, 824. 
 58. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158-60 (9th 
Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 59. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 924, 939-40  
(2005); see also Dratler, Statutory Sea, supra note 13, at 430 (discussing Grokster). 
 60. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37, 941.   
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Perfect 10 v. VISA suggests how fundamental things like proximate 
cause might simplify and rationalize the federal common law of 
secondary liability for IP infringement.  In coming to their divergent 
conclusions, the majority and dissent had to wrestle with two distinct 
elements of two separate theories of liability (contributory infringement 
and vicarious liability)—four elements in all.  The result was prolix 
opinions with highly repetitive analysis of the same alleged facts under 
different legal theories.61 
Yet, two of those headings were little more than proximate cause 
dressed up in fancy jargon.  After all, what is “causing, inducing or 
materially contributing” to infringement (the second element of 
contributory infringement) but causing it?  And when a defendant had 
“the right and ability to control infringing activity” but failed to do so, 
what has it done but cause the infringement?62  Aren’t these elements 
really little more than proximate cause in disguise? 
Psychology teaches us that tedious repetition produces boredom, 
failing attention and incomprehension, rather than clarity.  Wouldn’t it 
be clearer and better to treat the central issue—proximate cause—
explicitly and under its own heading, rather than discuss it several times 
using slightly different jargon each time? 
If the common law of secondary liability returned to the 
“fundamental things” of tort law like proximate cause, three good things 
might follow.  First, the courts might cut the burden of analysis (and the 
length of their opinions) by a least a factor or two.  Second, they might 
clarify the law by focusing more intensely on the central matter of 
inescapable judgment:  whether a causal nexus is strong enough on the 
facts of the case to justify liability. 
No formula or form of words can ever capture or constrain that 
judgment call.  As Judge Hand once said of the line between idea and 
expression in copyright law, “Nobody has ever been able to fix that 
boundary, and nobody ever can.”63  That’s why human judges, not 
computers, decide legal cases. 
Third and finally, a broader approach to the common-law issue of 
proximate cause would permit courts to take into account the sort of 
economic analysis that grew up naturally in the law of negligence.  
Among them is the powerful principle of the least-cost avoider.  
Especially in our age of increasingly limited resources, it makes sense to 
 
 61. See supra notes 46, 47, 51 (discussing Visa). 
 62. See supra note 55 (discussing Visa). 
 63. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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place the burden of avoiding harm—whether to persons or protected IP 
interests—on the person who can bear that burden at the least cost.  That 
goal implies viewing the party who could have avoided the direct 
infringement at the least cost as the proximate cause of it.  The doctrine 
is peculiarly appropriate for intellectual property cases, which involve no 
death, personal injury, or pain and suffering.   
Already this principle has a pedigree in IP law.  In one of the two 
cases most often cited for the rule that direct copyright infringement is a 
strict-liability offense, the Second Circuit addressed the defense that the 
publisher of an infringing biography had relied on the author’s assertions 
of non-infringement.64  The court rejected that defense, holding in effect 
that the publisher, whose business was to deal with authors and potential 
infringement, was the least-cost avoider.65 
The courts could have decided both of Tiffany and VISA on the 
same basis.  In Tiffany, defendant eBay maintained two expensive on-
line programs to curtail infringement, a notification program and a 
follow-up program.66  It had made an enormous investment in these 
programs, devoting an annual budget of up to $20 million to “trust and 
safety” generally, and maintaining 200 employees to police infringement 
alone.67  It had developed a “fraud engine” to detect improper activity—
an on-line software-hardware technology costing $5 million per year in 
research and development and employing over 13,000 search rules, 
including searches for 90 different Tiffany-related keywords.68  Tiffany 
was a principal beneficiary of those programs, which helped eBay 
remove 70-80% of infringing listings that Tiffany reported within twelve 
hours and 75% within four hours.69  In comparison, Tiffany itself had 
made only “modest” investment in policing the marketplace, 
maintaining only 1.15 to 1.6 full-time equivalent employees, who 
Tiffany admitted could not police the necessary volume of eBay sales on 
weekdays, let alone on the weekend.70  Tiffany had failed to sue any 
infringer directly, even known “Power Sellers,” because it preferred to 
sue eBay and make eBay do the heavy lifting instead.71  
 
 64. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945).  
 65. De Acosta, 146 F.2d at 410-12 (“[T]he protection accorded literary property would be of 
little value if it did not go against third persons, or if, it might be added, insulation from payment of 
damages could be secured by a publisher by merely refraining from making inquiry”). 
 66. See Tiffany Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 476-79. 
 67. See id. at 476.  
 68. See id. at 476-78, 491.  
 69. See id. at 478-79. 
 70. See id. at 484-85. 
 71. See id. at 488-89 (requests to suspend allegedly infringing sellers). 
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Although neither the Tiffany majority nor the dissent ever quite said 
so explicitly, the implication was clear:  Tiffany was the least-cost 
avoider.  It might have substantially reduced infringing activity with 
comparatively little extra expense.  Under those circumstances, to 
require eBay to do even more, while Tiffany was doing relatively little, 
would have violated basic principles of proximate cause and produced 
economic waste. 
In VISA, the principle of least-cost avoider could have been even 
stronger.  The plaintiff’s allegations suggested that interrupting online 
credit-card payments was not just the best way, but the only practical 
way, of stopping infringement.  Many of the direct infringers operated 
abroad, beyond the reach of U.S. law.  While corresponding foreign law 
might have made foreign legal action possible in theory, the mobility 
and guile of infringing businesses abroad made it impracticable.  A 
pirate needed no more than a laptop, a high capacity disk drive, and 
access to the Internet to run a highly profitable business of selling 
infringing images.  He did not even need a server system; he could 
continue his piracy (and move its locus around at will) by uploading his 
infringing images and payment software to any one of thousands of 
Internet-connected server systems available on line, worldwide.  Under 
these circumstances, there appeared to be no practical way of stopping 
the piracy other than stopping on-line payment. 
Without that remedy, plaintiff’s right to quiet enjoyment of its 
copyright became illusory, in violation of the sacred principle of Anglo-
American law: no right without a remedy.  As for the least-cost avoider, 
the credit card systems in VISA may have been not just the least 
expensive avoiders, but the only practical ones. 
Before we close this discussion of proximate cause, an additional 
observation is in order.  Two of the cases mentioned in the invitation to 
this Forum—Glenayre72 and Quanta Computer73—involved the 
venerable doctrine of patent exhaustion, i.e., the so-called “first sale” 
doctrine in patent law.74  The doctrine, which is over 150 years old, is 
 
 72. Glenayre Elecs., Inc. v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 851 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030 
(2006). 
 73. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). 
 74. See Glenayre Elecs., Inc., 443 F.3d at 863-64 (applying doctrine indirectly to corroborate 
holding that patentee that had sued and recovered damages for manufacturer’s unauthorized making 
and sale of patented products could not also recover separately for their use by manufacturer’s 
customer); Quanta Computer, Inc., 128 S. Ct. at 2117-18, 2121-22 (holding that the “authorized 
sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights and 
prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control postsale use of the article[,]” even if 
the patent covers only a method). 
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entirely judge-made, i.e., entirely federal common law.75  It rests 
primarily on the common law’s ancient antipathy to restraints on the 
alienation of chattels, for it prevents users of and traders in patent-
protected goods from having to look up the chattels’ patent pedigree 
before every sale or use.76 
But the first-sale doctrine can also be viewed as a corollary of the 
doctrine of proximate cause.  Downstream users of patent-protected 
products—especially those several sales removed from the patentee—
are simply too remote from direct harm to the patentee’s interests to 
enmesh them in litigation, especially when the patentee could avoid the 
harm at much lower cost just by extracting a suitable royalty from the 
manufacturer and first seller.  It would make no sense, for example, for 
the holder of a patent on a special kind of screw to allow it to be made 
and sold freely, but to seek royalties or damages from every product 
made using the patented screw, even by people who might be unaware 
that subassemblies they buy on the open market contain it. 
III. CULPABILITY 
The second fundamental thing that has stood the test of time in tort 
law is culpability.  The Supreme Court reminded us of this point in 
Grokster.77  There it developed, out of whole common-law cloth,78 a new 
“inducement” theory of secondary liability for copyright infringement.79  
The Ninth Circuit had excused the technological successors to Napster’s 
well-known peer-to-peer file-sharing service from secondary liability.80  
In so doing, that court had focused on the defendants’ lack of a 
centralized index to infringing material and their consequent absence of 
 
See also Glenayre Elecs., Inc., 128 S.Ct. at 2115 (“The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion 
provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item”).  
See generally, 2 JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, § 7.05 [hereinafter, 
Dratler Licensing]. 
 75. See supra note 74. 
 76. See Dratler Licensing, supra note 74, at § 7.05, page 5-6. 
 77. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 78. For a complete discussion why both Sony and Grokster were federal-common-law 
decisions, and not examples of applying or interpreting statutes, see Dratler, Statutory Sea, supra 
note 13, at 418-35, n.37.  
 79. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (“For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article 
doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a 
sensible one for copyright.  We adopt it here . . .”). 
 80. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1154, 1157-60, vacated and remanded, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  
See also supra text accompanying notes 57-60. 
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knowledge of or control over infringing material.81  But the Supreme 
Court saw the bigger picture:  evidence of the defendants’ deliberate and 
premeditated encouragement and exploitation of deliberate infringement 
by 50 million Napster users after Napster’s demise.82 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Grokster reminded us of three 
important things.  First, except in the field of patents, where general 
statutory provisions exist,83 the field of secondary liability for 
intellectual property infringement is largely a matter of federal common 
law.  Within the interstices of the governing federal statutes, courts are 
free to find their way on a case-by-case basis, just as the Grokster Court 
itself did in announcing a new theory of inducing infringement of 
copyright. 
Second, the Court reminded us that human culpability—the 
wellspring of legal liability since time immemorial—still applies in the 
age of bits, bytes and blogs.  Complex technologies may have controlled 
or influenced consequences, but in the end it was we human beings who 
created them, owned them, operated them and (on occasion) abused 
them.  Only by holding people responsible (sometimes through the legal 
abstractions from which they profit) could we hope to reduce the 
incidence of abuse.  
As yet—and for the foreseeable future—no technology is self-
generating and self-operating.  Even if it were, we could still hold its 
designer or initiator responsible.  The human hand behind the machine is 
what we must govern to achieve a just society. 
Finally, the Court reminded us that, although patent and copyright 
infringement may have been strict-liability defenses, secondary liability 
for another’s infringement depends upon a defendant’s culpability or 
state of mind.84  As the Grokster Court itself held, inducement liability 
depends on a purposeful or deliberate state of mind.85  That is the highest 
 
 81. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163-64 (no material contribution, hence no contributory 
infringement); id. at 1165-66 (no right and ability to control, hence no vicarious liability). 
 82. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937-40. 
 83. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (inducing infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (contributory 
infringement).  Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (special vicarious liability for supplying essential components 
of patented invention for use abroad); 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (special liability for importing products of 
patented process). 
 84. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Dratler Cyberlaw, supra note 12, at § 
5A.03[2], [3]. 
 85. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37 (“one who distributes a device with the object of 
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties”) 
(emphasis added).  See also id. at 924 (each defendant “clearly voiced the objective that recipients 
use [its products] to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage 
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level of culpability in the Model Penal Code’s hierarchy of purposeful, 
knowing, reckless and negligent states of mind.86 
Contributory infringement depends upon the next level, knowing of 
the infringing activity.87  Although the black letter law of vicarious 
liability does not mention any state of mind,88 some level of culpability 
necessarily inheres in its two explicit elements taken together.  If you 
derive a direct financial benefit from someone else’s infringement and 
have the right and ability to control it but don’t, aren’t you at least 
reckless or negligent in failing to stop it?  Doesn’t the motive of 
financial benefit suggest a venal motive perhaps even higher than mere 
recklessness? 
Applied explicitly, the fundamental thing of culpability could have 
helped resolve the difficult cases we have discussed.  The facts of 
Tiffany make it hard to discern an iota of culpability on defendant eBay’s 
part.  Not only had eBay not been reckless or negligent; it had spent 
millions and devoted a substantial part of its work force and corporate 
structure to stamping out infringement.  Its compliance group and 
programs worked efficiently and effectively, although perhaps not 
precisely as Tiffany might have liked.  In comparison, Tiffany itself did 
relatively little.  It didn’t even bring individual suits against the worst 
“Power Sellers” of infringing items, preferring to place the burden and 
cost of policing the marketplace on eBay.  These facts refuted, not 
proved, eBay’s culpability. 
Assessing human culpability also helps us analyze the difficult 
issue of first impression in VISA.  There VISA and its member banks 
made a business of providing quick, easy and cheap payment services 
through credit cards, including online services.  The infringers used 
those payment services to create highly successful piratical businesses 
outside the legal and practical reach of U.S. copyright law.  According to 
the complaint, the only viable way to stop them was to deprive them of 
those payment services, and doing so would shut them down.  VISA and 
its banks had been notified of the infringement, which involved only a 
few of their millions of payment-service customers, and they could have 
stopped it.  Yet they refused to take action to stop the illegal activity, as 
their own rules required, although they had done so successfully with 
illegal offshore online gambling.  Finally, VISA and its members got a 
 
infringement”) (emphasis added); id. at 940 (after summarizing evidence: “The unlawful objective 
is unmistakable”). 
 86. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2). 
 87. See supra note 24 and the accompanying text (citing Dratler Cyberlaw). 
 88. See supra note 25 and the accompanying text (citing Dratler Cyberlaw). 
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cut—a stated percentage—of the price of every illegal sale of a 
copyrighted image, in the form of credit-card processing fees.  In a 
seminal case on secondary liability, a similar percentage interest was 
among the Second Circuit’s reasons for imposing it.89 
Under these circumstances, does not VISA have some culpability 
for the piracy?  Is it not at least reckless or negligent in failing to stop it?  
The issue here was not the technology or the flow of bits and bytes, as 
the Ninth Circuit’s majority surmised, but the perennial ebb and flow of 
humans beings’ responsibility for the natural consequences of their acts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Over the past two decades, American judicial analysis has turned 
increasingly rigid, formalistic and mechanical.  In constitutional law, we 
look compulsively to our Framers’ “original intent,” as if we could see 
in the vanishing (and disputed) mists of the eighteenth century a clear 
blueprint for applying venerable principles to conditions that our 
Framers never could have imagined.  In the field of intellectual property, 
we try to freeze common-law decisions like Sony into an abstract quasi-
statutory rule that any technology used to infringe copyrights is 
acceptable as long as it has substantial non-infringing uses.90  In 
assessing secondary liability, we petrify common-law precedents like 
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.91 into two-part tests that take on a life of their 
own, as if they were statutes passed by Congress, which they most 
decidedly are not. 
We seek a mechanical formula for every case, as if we hope some 
day to program computers to replace judges.  Yet the more formulaic we 
try to make our jurisprudence, the more our decisions paradoxically 
become prolix, tedious and inaccessible to nonspecialists in IP, let alone 
the general public.  We are receding from the goals of clarity, 
consistency and comprehensibility at an increasingly rapid rate. 
Solomon did not decline to split the baby based on a four-part test.  
He did not require twenty pages of reasoning to reach his decision.  He 
 
 89. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(imposing vicarious liability upon department store for concessionaire’s sales of bootleg records 
where store reserved right to supervise and dismiss concessionaire’s employees and took 10-12 % 
of its sales revenue as concession fee). 
 90. Both practical and jurisprudential problems arise when courts receive abstract statements 
of the holdings of precedents as if they were statutory prescriptions adopted by Congress after 
hearings, investigation and due democratic deliberation. See Dratler, Statutory Sea, supra note 13, 
at 422-29. 
 91. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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used wisdom, insight into human motivation, an ability to foresee 
consequences and common sense—things that today fall under the 
collective heading of “good judgment.”  No doubt Solomon, were he to 
have encountered claims of secondary IP infringement, would have 
based his decisions on fundamental things like culpability and proximate 
cause. 
I am not for a moment suggesting that we dispense with reasoned 
decisions or precedent.  Nor am I suggesting that the courts ignore the 
language of statutes when statutes apply.  What I am suggesting is that 
we let the common law be the common law again.  That includes making 
federal-common-law decisions when statutory language provides no 
answers.  It does not include pretending that abstract statements of the 
holdings of federal common-law precedents is statutory language, 
entitled to the same deference (and subject to the same rigidity of 
application) as language adopted by the people’s representatives. 
So I wish that Congress would adopt a simple one-sentence statute 
to govern all of secondary liability for infringement of intellectual 
property (other than patents, which have their own special statutory 
rules92).  That sentence would read as follows:  “A person is liable for 
another’s infringement if that person’s acts are a proximate cause of the 
infringement and that person is culpable for it.”  
If Congress did that, we might see judicial opinions focus on what 
really matters, rather than abstractions ripped out of context from 
precedent, whose authors never intended them to apply so broadly. 
But of course Congress will do no such thing.  If it tried, the 
lobbyists and ideologues would commandeer the simple, one-sentence 
bill.  Before they let go, it would have become many pages of 
gobbledygook, just like Section 512 or 1201 of the Copyright Act.93  
So we had better not even whisper that Congress should try.  Our 
only hope is for courts, over time, to reacquire the habit of building 
federal common law case by case, with an eye toward the general 
principles of tort law that have served the common law well for 
centuries.  
 
 92. See supra note 83.  Other forms of IP also have some special rules, but they are mostly 
limited to particular factual situations.  See, e.g., Lanham Act § 32(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (special 
limitations on secondary liability for trademark infringement of printers, publishers, domain-name 
registrars, and makers of technologies for blanking undesired portions of audiovisual works). 
 93. For a rant on how lobbyists turned simple, basic principles into the statutory monstrosities 
of Sections 512 and 1201 of the Copyright Act, see generally Dratler, Cyberlaw, supra note 12, at 
§§ 3.02, 6.01[5], 6.07[2].  
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There may be some hope in that regard.  Whatever else it may be 
doing in constitutional law and fields remote from IP, the Supreme Court 
has done much in recent years to abjure rigid formalism and restore 
federal common law in the field of IP.  In Sony and Grokster, the Court 
showed us how common-law reasoning could create a legal standard 
(“substantial noninfringing use”)94 or a whole new legal theory (inducing 
infringement) out of whole cloth, while operating in the interstices of 
federal statutes that provided no other basis for decision.  In eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court directed us back to the old common-
law calculus for injunctive relief, repudiating a mechanical rule that 
injunctions nearly always issue to stop infringement.95  And in cases like 
Festo96 and MedImmune v. Genentech97 the Court repudiated the Federal 
Circuit’s rigid formalism, respectively, in assessing technological 
equivalents in patent law and in accepting claims for declaratory 
judgments under Article III. 
Not only are the Supreme Court’s recent opinions in IP clear 
repudiations of formalism and literalism and ringing endorsements of 
flexibility and the common law; they are also, by and large, the shortest, 
clearest and easiest to appreciate of the Supreme Court’s work product 
over the last several years.98  And they are so despite IP law’s notorious 
abstractness and difficulty. 
Perhaps IP law’s general nerdiness, obscurity and lack of direct 
political consequence leaves judges free to act like judges.  No matter 
 
 94. See Dratler, Statutory Sea, supra note 13, at 421-22 n.37. 
 95. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (“[T]he decision 
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, 
and . . . such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent 
disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards”).  See generally, Jay Dratler, Jr., 
eBay’s Practical Effect: Two Differing Versions, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. L.J. 37-40 (2008). 
 96. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737-38 (2002) 
(rejecting Federal Circuit’s formalistic rule that any amendment to any patent claim creates a 
complete bar to applying the doctrine of equivalents to amended claim elements, and opting for a 
more flexible rule). 
 97. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 S. Ct. 764, 774 & n.11, 777 
(2007) (rejecting Federal Circuit’s formalistic conclusion that courts lack Article III jurisdiction 
over a patent licensee’s declaratory-judgment challenge to a licensed patent when the license is 
unbreached, and repudiating the “reasonable apprehension of suit” rule on which that conclusion 
was based).  
 98. For discussion of a counterexample from the difficult field of detainee treatment, see Jay 
Dratler, Jr., A Brief Lament on Hamdan, 5 & n.11 (Univ. of Akron Legal Studies Research, 
Working Paper No. 06-14, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=913822 (noting that the Supreme Court’s various opinions collectively 
subsumed over eight times the length of our entire Constitution, including amendments and obsolete 
provisions).  
07-DRATLER 5/21/2010 5:03 PM 
42 AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL [3:23 
how decisive or path-breaking, an IP ruling rarely brings public or 
political outcry.  So judges can apply the fundamental things without 
fear of political lynching. 
If I am right in this conclusion, then maybe IP law can serve as a 
temporary reservoir for the true spirit of our judicial system and our 
common law.  Maybe some years hence, when the political storms have 
subsided, that spirit will emerge from its hidden reservoir in IP and 
create a beneficent general infection, restoring our “least dangerous 
branch” to its former power and glory.  
 
